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Law of Naval Warfare as Applicable to
Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping
Ladies and Gentlemen, it is indeed a great pleasure to be back at the Naval
War College with this distinguished group of international lawyers, diplomats,
historians, naval lawyers and line officers from the United States and Allied
nations. This subject is complex but timely, and deserves the attention of all of
us. The War College is to be commended for conducting this symposium on
the Law of Naval Warfare related to targeting enemy merchant shipping.
I wish to commend AdmiralJim Service on a fine presentation. His decision
matrix for the commanders on the scene is particularly helpful. I will build on
his remarks and present other considerations which may be useful to internationallawyers in formulating rules of conduct governing naval warfare. I will
confine my remarks to the operational considerations in targeting enemy
merchant shipping.
I certainly agree that future wars will be heavily influenced by modem
technological advances in weaponry. Today, there is a booming international
arms market in modem submarines, mines, long range reconnaissance and ASW
aircraft, anti-ship cruise missiles, land based surface to air missiles, chemical
weapons, coastal defense missiles, ballistic missiles, and, alarmingly, nuclear
proliferation. When you consider that there are active ballistic missile programs
in countries as diverse as Argentina, Iraq, India, China and Israel and that the
warheads could be chemical, nuclear or conventional, at least some form ofSDI
does not sound unreasonable.
Forty countries in the Third World receive military hardware from other
Third World export industries in addition to developed countries. There are 48
countries with anti-ship cruise missiles (2100 Harpoons, 2600 Exocets, 10,000
SS-N-2's). There are 19 countries with diesel attack submarines, 21 countries
with naval mining capabilities and 10-16 countries with chemical warfare
capabilities. There are increasing numbers of sophisticated submarines available
to the Third.World in the future, (examples: India and Brazil building SSN'S;
the French Rubis - 3000 ton SSN; advanced air-independent propulsion schemes
for diesel submarines - Swedish Stirling engine, West German fuel cell research,
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Canadian low power nuclear reactor, Italian Toroidal). India has purchased 6
Soviet Kilo's and 2 West Gennan Type 209 diesels.
Recall that a World War II vintage mine (100-125 kg whd) put the USS
Roberts out of action. A hit on the side of the ship nearly broke it in hal( Superb
damage control by the crew saved the ship. However, mines did limited damage
to oilers in the Persian Gul£
Aerospatiale and MBB are working on a supersonic successor to the Exocet
called ANS. It is stealthy (low radar cross-section), Mach 2+, 15G maneuver,
dual mode (radar and IR) guidance, range 180 km, sea-skimmer (20 ft, offdeck),
ramjet and integral solid booster propulsion. A current sub-sonic Exocet in
the Falklands sank HMS Sheffield, damaged HMS Glamorgan and sunk the
merchant Atlantic Conveyor (2 Exocets). In the Persian Gulf, Exocets put
the USS Stark out of action but did limited damage to large oilers; the oil kept
flowing.
In Anti-Submarine Warfare, 2 ASW carriers, 15 frigates, 6 submarines of the
Royal Navy plus various ASW aircraft expended over 200 weapons against only
1 Argentine submarine and a sea full of false contacts.
As the examples above indicate, the vulnerability of modem naval platforms
even, or perhaps especially, in limited war situations will be a factor. A
Commander must take into consideration the various threats to his own forces
if he is tasked to destroy or interdict merchant ships, or to protect merchant
ships as in the Persian Gulf situation. As Admiral Guilbault pointed out, the
threat also involves the threat of detection from space or other active and passive
means, including the visual sighting of a flaming datum.
Let us now look at a general war scenario - NATO versus Warsaw Pact. This
situation is possible but gets more unlikely each day. The NATO maritime
strategy is to take the war to the enemy. An early ASW campaign is contemplated. NATO naval forces would conduct offensive operations in Soviet
sea denial zones (2000 km from the "homeland," usually) and impose a high
attrition on Soviet naval forces, thereby neutralizing their military capabilities
and assuring freedom of the seas to support u.S. and Allied operations and
control the critical sea lines ofcommunications that link the Allies with deployed
forces.
Naval forces would support the land battle on the flanks. Amphibious forces
might be landed. u.S. and Allied submarines, aircraft and surface ships will be
far too busy with limited assets targeting enemy submarines, surface ships, airfields,
d sites, bases and facilities ashore to waste weapons and risk detection in targeting
enemy merchant ships. At this stage, Warsaw Pact shipping has little military
value considering their extensive and internal land lines of communication. A
mining campaign in the Baltic and Black Seas and Arctic Ocean would be more
to the point.
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In a general war, the Warsaw Pact has a similar problem. The first priority of
their SSNs will probably be to protect their SSBNs in nuclear reserve. If any
remain, they will attack ships of the Battle Group, amphibious forces or
underway replenishment groups. Soviet Naval Air has a similar priority and has
insufficient assets to risk higher casualties by attacking NATO merchant shipping
in the Atlantic. If the situation became an attrition war against the sea lines of
communications, similar to World War II, NATO would convoy its merchant
ships and the Soviets would attempt to sink without warning. One might argue
that the strict rules in the London Protocol of 1936 should apply to Allied
merchant ships sailing independently in sanitized lanes. However, one would
have to assume that the protocol would be violated or at best interpreted
narrowly.
Let us tum to the case of a limited war. Here the situation changes drastically.
The characteristics of a low level or regional conflict are different from a general
war. For example:
- Usually the battle space and sea room are constrained.
- Forces are usually concentrated rather than dispersed.
- Forces operate near or over land and in shallow water, thus making the forces
more vulnerable and degrading certain sensors and weapon systems.
- The visual and electronic environment is confused with a mixture of friendly,
enemy and neutral ships and aircraft.
- There is a low tolerance for damage and personnel casualties, including hostages,
at least in the U.S. Generally, the public's attention span and tolerance vis-a-vis
uses of military force will be directly proportional to the loss ofHfe in the action,
factored by its duration.
- There are definite rules of engagement constraints on offensive and defensive
actions. Admiral Crowe, the former Chairman of the Joint ChiefS ofSta{f, stated
that one of his achievements during his tenure was to modifY the rules of
engagement so that U.s. forces in crisis situations could take defensive action
without absorbing the first blow.
- The identification assessments are complex, e.g., the incident in the Persian Gulf
when the USS Vincennes mistakenly identified a commercial aircraft as a military
aircraft and shot it down with surface to air missiles.
- Friendly support and assistance are varied and unpredictable.
- The threat can be from land, boats, ships, submarines, mines, fighters, bombers,
helicopters, swimmers and unmanned vehicles.
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- There are political constraints on the use of force that may be far more
stringent than the legal constraints in the Commander's Handbook on the
Law of Naval Operations (NWP-9).
- There is a high incentive to keep the superpowers from direct confrontation or from taking one side or the other.
- Ground commitments will be less tolerable than naval commitments.

The above considerations apply generally in the case of regional conflicts. In
the case of targeting enemy merchant ships, there are other problems. Ideally,
one should have a global array of sensors, weapons and delivery systems plus an
intelligence network including communication and signal intelligence that can
sort out various merchant ships while still in port and then continuously track
the particular ship all the way to its final destination. What is needed is a complete
library of the electronic, acoustic and visual fingerprints ofall merchant shipping;
an identification and assessment of cargo as it is loaded; the probable shipping
routes; a space surveillance system that can continuously track the merchant ship
while at sea irrespective of whether or not the ship is emitting electronic signals;
a command, control and communication system that can hand off the track to
surface ships, aircraft and/or submarines that are positioned to target the
previously identified enemy merchant ship; weapons that can be fired beyond
the radar or visual horizon with the discrimination to hit the right merchant ship
and with the accuracy and speed to compensate for the time late in firing at a
moving target and the right warhead to accomplish the mission - (which is not
necessarily to sink the enemy merchant ship). I would much rather have a low
cost weapon that is designed to render the ship immobile - dead in the water with damaged propellers or ship control capability - than have to clean up the
oil spill from a 300,000 ton tanker. I doubt if the Coast Guard wants to clean it
up either. In a limited war or crisis control situation, environmental considerations are going to be important factors.
No nation has the complete capability as I have just described. Some do worse
than others. Iraq fired Exocets on large radar contacts hoping the ship was a
tanker. We know that Iraq made at least one mistake in the Stark incident. Iran
planted mines and harassed all merchant ships indiscriminately with missiles and
small caliber ammunition fired from helicopters and small ships.
I would have to say that measured against the ideal merchant targeting system
described above, u.S. capability is marginal at best. We have no comprehensive
library of fingerprints. As yet, we do not have a space based radar satellite system
for surveillance of the surface of oceans. We have space assets and sensors that
are useful under various conditions, but the ability to keep a continuous track
and sort all the friendly, enemy and neutral merchant ships that ply the oceans
is limited. Our over the horizon targeting system for long range weapons like
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Harpoon and Tomahawk against moving targets leaves much to be desired in
terms of hitting the right target on time in a confused environment of friendly,
enemy and neutral merchant ships. Our ships, submarines and aircraft are
designed primarily for attacking enemy warships, submarines, aircraft and
striking targets ashore. Our weapons are optimized for those missions, not for
use against merchant ships. We have no low cost weapon in numbers for
disabling a merchant ship. This is not to say that we don't have weapons to use,
but a Tomahawk cruise missile at $1.2 million a copy and in short supply would
not be the weapon of choice against a merchant ship.
What I am really saying is that targeting enemy ships in a limited war is a
tough job. Because of the difficulty in detecting, tracking, and identifying targets
in broad ocean areas, the operational commander is forced to search in confined
littoral areas, probably near the destination of the particular merchant ship. Then
he must use ships and aircraft on scene to locate, track, visually identifY and then
assess the character of the particular merchant ship. I recall in 1974 during the
Cyprus Crisis, I was a Battle Group commander aboard the carrier Forrestal with
accompanying cruisers and destroyers and submarines. I was ordered to take a
position well south of Cyprus just to make sure the Soviets understood that they
were not to get involved in the conflict between Greece and Turkey with their
Mediterranean Squadron. I was also tasked to maintain continuous surveillance
in the Mediterranean between Greece and Cyprus and make reports on all ships
in the area, particularly Greek warships. We flew the airwing round the clock
starting at dawn trying to keep an updated surface picture. It was a back-breaking
operation and we were only partially successful. We could at least sort out
merchant ships from Greek warships but as far as sorting out various merchant
ships one from the other, that was another problem. There were just too many
of all types of ships at sea.
Now the situation has improved. We have better intelligence, sensors,
surveillance aircraft and space assets, but it is still a tremendous challenge.
There is technology available to fill in the gaps in an optimum enemy
merchant ship surveillance, tracking and targeting system. For example: an active
space based surveillance system, imaging radar, infrared techniques, and other
technical approaches would help in establishing a coherent surface picture. The
Global Positioning System (GPS) will help. I am sure that Admiral Guilbault
could devise a space and C 3 tracking and handoff system that could do the job
if we gave him the money to do it. I think we should press on with developing
the new technology. Limited conflicts and regional crises put a higher premium
on intelligence, surveillance, identification, and accurate assessments. In our
planning we often assume that limited war is a lesser included offense of general
war and that ships, aircraft, sensors and weapon systems designed for general war
are automatically suitable in low intensity conflicts. That is often not the case
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and we need to look more closely at our limited war capabilities and make
improvements.
Thus far, I have assumed that in a limited war the u.s. Navy would be tasked
to sink enemy merchant ships. This is possible, but unlikely in my judgment. If
we are so tasked, we would probably be politically constrained to visit and search
procedures to accurately determine the character, destination and cargo of the
ship, before taking further action. This means close surveillance by ships and
aircraft, using visual means to establish identities. I believe it would be counterproductive to embark on a campaign of sinking enemy merchant ships at sea in
a limited war when there are much more lucrative and politically important
fixed targets ashore that could contribute to the limited objective at hand. The
Libyan strike is a good example.
I think it more likely that the u.s. Navy will be in the role of protecting
merchant shipping and assuring freedom of the seas for world commerce. A
disruption in world shipping will have a rippling effect in the interrelated world
economies that probably cannot be tolerated for long by either the developed
or developing countries. In this situation, the incentive will be to confine the
conflict geographically, limit the participants, persuade the maritime nations and
"superpowers" to cooperate in keeping the sea lines of communication open,
and encourage, cajole or threaten the belligerents to negotiate. The u.s. Navy
may be tasked to convoy merchant ships, provide for their protection against a
variety of threats, sort out neutral merchant ships from belligerents, and use force,
as necessary, to contribute to political objectives.
However, whether we end up protecting merchant shipping or targeting
them, the requirement for a global surveillance, sorting-out, tracking, hand-off,
targeting and suitable engagement system for merchant shipping is still valid. We
need to develop a coherent surface picture for the oceans of the world. In any
event, the regional crisis and limited war situation need a fresh approach. While
the general roles and missions of the u.s. Navy may remain the same, the
methods ofimplementation may be significantly changed. Commanders will not
have a free hand in carrying out their mission. The Rules ofEngagement (ROE)
will be dictated by the National Command Authority and blessed by the State
Department. The political constraints may be far more stringent than any legal
restraints in NWP-9. Minimizing loss of life, both military and civilian, and
damage to property or the environment will be important factors. Weapon
systems and sensors may have to be tailored to be more useful in limited wars
and crisis control. The Navy may have to adjust to new missions such as assisting
in drug enforcement and the like. There is a continuing and vital role for the
u.s. Navy, but the Navy must be flexible enough and have the capability to
adapt to changing conditions.
Although the policy and ROE constraints in a given limited conflict scenario
might be quite stringent, naval commanders must find flexibility in the laws of
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naval warfare to target enemy merchant ships ifthe need arises. This may require
a reassessment or fresh interpretation of the London Protocol of 1936.
Finally, a note of caution in all that I have said about limited conflicts and
regional crisis. First, the Navy must retain its capability to fight a general war if
necessary. Second, while a limited conflict might necessitate new ways of
implementation and a certain tailoring of sensors and weapons, it by no means
follows that the aircraft, surface ships and submarines can be less capable and
sophisticated. The opposite is more likely the case.
*Consultant, Applied Physics Laboratory, John Hopkins University. Former Professor of Law, George
Washington University, Washington, D.C. Vice Adrniral, U.S Navy (Ret.).

